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The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that the broad fiduciary duties the
ERISA imposes on plan trustees require plan trustees to administer pension
plans for the sole benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries. The Fourth
Circuit stated that these fiduciary duties require plan trustees to insure that
plan participants are given adequate notice of any plan changes that may
affect participants' or beneficiaries' rights. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that because MEBA neither gave Rodriguez adequate notice of his option
under the plan, nor allowed Rodriguez a fair opportunity to pursue his
claim, MEBA failed to fulfill the fiduciary duties it owed to Rodriguez.
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the MEBA trustees failed
to adequately notify Rodriguez of his option to terminate his benefits. The
court further held that Rodriguez must be given the right to exercise his
1968 option to either suspend his pension check while accruing further
benefits or to continue to receive his pension check while foregoing further
accruals. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to the district court to allow Rodriguez to
exercise his option, and to calculate the precise amount of the benefits that
would have accrued had Rodriguez exercised the option.
GOVERNMENT BENEFITS

In Deel v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2434 (1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered the validity of Virginia's transfer of assets rule, a part of
Virginia's program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
The plaintiffs in Deel, Anna R. Deel and Onnie Dale Adcock, applied for
benefits under the Virginia AFDC program. The Virginia Department of
Social Services (Department) denied the plaintiffs' applications on the basis
of Virginia's transfer of assets rule. The Virginia transfer of assets rule
denies eligibility for AFDC benefits to persons who within two years of
their application have transferred real or personal property for less than
adequate compensation, ostensibly for the purpose of becoming eligible for
AFDC benefits. The Department denied Deel's application because two days
before applying for AFDC benefits Deel transferred a fifty-nine acre parcel
of land to her daughter and son-in-law for less than fair market value. The
Department rejected Adcock's request for benefits because a short time
after submitting her application Adcock sold her interest in a mobile home
to her brother-in-law for less than fair market value, and consequently, less
than adequate compensation. Administrative hearing officers and the State
Board of Review denied the plaintiffs' administrative appeals.
In October 1985 Deel filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia against the Commissioner of the Department
and the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. Deel sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Adcock intervened
as a plaintiff. The suit alleged that the transfer of assets rule violated the
"availability principle" derived from the Social Security Act, which requires
that the Department consider only assets currently available to an applicant
in determining eligibility.
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In Deel the parties did not dispute any facts, and both the plaintiffs
and the defendants filed motions for summary judgment restricted to the
issue of the validity of the transfer of assets rule. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the Virginia rule was
a valid state antifraud device, consistent with the Social Security Act. A
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and ordered
the entry of summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit
granted the defendant's application for rehearing en banc.
On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit first recognized that the AFDC is a
scheme of cooperative federalism. The Deel court determined that the federal
government largely is responsible for financing the AFDC, but that states
bear the primary responsibility for administering the program. The Fourth
Circuit stated that under the AFDC system courts had given states great
flexibility in the states' determination of eligibility requirements for recipients. The Deel court noted that the United States Supreme Court emphasized the value of the state role in AFDC administration in New York State
Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). The Fourth
Circuit determined that, under the Supreme Court's holding in Dublino,
the Fourth Circuit must find a "clear manifestation" of congressional intent
to forbid a state to employ a transfer of assets rule for the Fourth Circuit
to invalidate the Virginia rule. The Deel court concluded that the nature
and purpose of the availability principle reveal no such intent.
In Deel the Fourth Circuit determined that the purpose of the availability
principle is to preclude the fictional imputation of income to AFDC applicants from relatives and housemates who never actually contribute to the
AFDC assistance unit. The Deel court concluded that no such fictional
imputation of income was involved in the Virginia transfer of assets rule.
The Fourth Circuit found that, instead of basing eligibility determinations
on assets that the applicant never had, the rule disqualifies applicants who
had assets and voluntarily transferred the assets to a friend or relative to
receive AFDC benefits rather than expend the assets. The Deel court
determined that many states use a transfer of assets rule to prevent what
essentially is fraud against the AFDC system, and that the transfer of assets
rule is not the type of provision Congress intended to cover when Congress
formulated the availability principle. Additionally, the court noted that the
best evidence of congressional intent indicates that the transfer of assets
rule is consistent with federal AFDC policy. The Deel court suggested that
the court could infer Congress's receptivity to transfer of assets rules from
the fact that Congress specifically has endorsed a transfer of assets rule in
the context of the Medicaid program.
In Deel the Fourth Circuit determined that two amendments to the
AFDC statute further supported the court's conclusion that the transfer of
assets rule is compatible with the availability principle. The Fourth Circuit
observed that the amendments are part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982 (OBRA) and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA).
The Deel court concluded that OBRA and DEFRA furnish strong indications
that the Virginia transfer of assets rule furthers congressional intent. The
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Fourth Circuit noted that the legislative history of the OBRA provisions
indicates that Congress intended that state administrators of AFDC programs not allow families to receive AFDC benefits if they have resources
upon which the administrator reasonably could expect the family to draw.
The Deel court emphasized that the transfer of assets rule attempts to
enforce precisely this policy by preventing applicants who have resources
from making a transfer to qualify themselves for AFDC benefits. The
Fourth Circuit also stressed that congressional policy similarly demands that
state administrators restrict AFDC funds to those most in need. The Deel
court concluded that the transfer of assets rule promotes this policy because
the use of limited AFDC funds by those who improperly have disposed of
assets necessarily deprives those in greater need.
In addition to the OBRA provisions, the Fourth Circuit in Deel determined that a provision of the DEFRA amendment provided further insight
into congressional attitudes toward AFDC. The Deel court relied on a
provision allowing families to continue to receive AFDC benefits while the
families are making "good faith efforts" to dispose of real property that
would make the families ineligible for aid. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that the requirement of "good faith" in the amendment suggests that
Congress intended that state administrators not allow applicants to render
themselves eligible for aid through bad faith transfers of assets to relatives
or friends for inadequate compensation. Accordingly, the Deel court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that the amendments do not provide adequate
support for the transfer of assets rule. The Fourth Circuit stated that the
plaintiffs based their argument on the incorrect assumption that the court
must invalidate the state transfer of assets provision unless Congress specifically has approved the state provision. The Deel court explained that
the correct approach involves a determination of the proper scope of the
availability principle. Under this approach, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the OBRA and DEFRA amendments reinforce the view that Congress
did not intend to undermine state efforts to prevent fraud against the funds
of the program that Congress had enacted.
In deciding that Virginia's transfer of assets rule was valid, the Deel
court also stressed the importance of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services' position in the resolution of the case. The Fourth Circuit explained
that the Secretary has expertise in the administration of AFDC and, therefore, that the Secretary's opinion is entitled to judicial respect. The Deel
court noted that the Secretary has observed state transfer of assets rules
since 1976 and consistently has approved the transfer rules. Because of the
consistency of the Secretary's approval, the Fourth Circuit gave the administrator's position substantial deference. Furthermore, the Deel court determined that the need of the states for stable rules of AFDC administration
supports deference to the Secretary's position.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Deel rejected the plaintiffs' challenge to
the particular provisions of the Virginia transfer of assets rule. The Deel
court determined that the plaintiffs' assertion that the provisions of the rule
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because the
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rules are overbroad and overly rigid was without merit. The Fourth Circuit
noted that the Virginia rule did not disqualify AFDC recipients solely on
the basis of a property transfer for an improper purpose. Instead, the Deel
court emphasized that the Virginia rule only applies to transfers made for
the purpose of receiving AFDC benefits to which the applicant is not
entitled. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the Virginia transfer of
assets rule's requirement that applicants provide evidence that other resources were available to meet the applicants' needs at the time of the
alleged transfer constituted a reasonable means of identifying improper
transactions. The Deel court determined that no reason exists for a person
without other resources to transfer assets for less than the assets were worth
unless the transfer was part of a plan to become eligible for AFDC benefits.
In Deel the Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia transfer of assets rule
is a valid state provision. The Deel court based its decision on the court's
regard for the state role in AFDC administration, faithfulness to the court's
view of the purposes of the availability principle, and deference to the
position of the agency overseeing AFDC administration. The Fourth Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that a federal statute or regulation must
authorize every state initiative in AFDC administration. The Deel court
concluded that this requirement would impair the cooperative role for the
states that Congress envisioned under the AFDC program. Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that Virginia's
transfer of assets rule was valid.
Judge Ervin dissented from the majority opinion in Deel. Judge Ervin
was concerned with what he viewed as the majority's disregard for a previous
Fourth Circuit case in which the court invalidated an earlier Virginia transfer
of assets rule. Additionally, Judge Ervin criticized the majority's attempt
to read congressional silence in the AFDC context as implied authorization
for policies expressly authorized in other federal aid programs. Chief Judge
Winter wrote a separate dissent expressing his conclusion that even if no
evidence of fraud exists, the Virginia transfer of assets rule is so broad that
the rule penalizes the innocent as well as the guilty. Chief Justice Winter,
therefore, determined that the Virginia transfer of assets rule denies equal
protection of the laws because the rule arbitrarily withholds a government
benefit without a rational purpose.
In Milam v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
United States Department of Labor, 874 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1989), the
Fourth Circuit considered whether a claimant may receive cash benefits
under part C of the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. sections 931-934
(1982) (the Act), when that claimant has been approved for Part B benefits
but has not received any cash benefits because the claimant's benefits were
offset under the excess earnings offset provision of the Act. In 1973 Milam
filed a claim for benefits under part B of the Act, 30 U.S.C. sections 921925. The Social Security Administration (SSA) approved the claim, finding
that Milam suffered from complicated pneumoconiosis. The SSA refused
to award cash benefits to Milam under part B, however, because the SSA
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found that Milam earned more than $2100 in the year for which Milam
claimed benefits. Under part B of the Act, a claimant cannot receive cash
benefits due to an excess earnings offset provision in part B if that claimant
earns more than $2100 per year.
Because Milam continued to earn more than $2100 per year after the
SSA's decision and, consequently, could not obtain cash benefits under part
B of the Act, Milam filed for cash benefits under part C of the Act in
1980. In considering Milam's claim for cash benefits under part C, the
Department of Labor found that the Act and regulations under the Act
provide solely for the payment of medical benefits under part C to claimants
whose claims for part B benefits had been approved. The Department of
Labor, thus, denied Milam's claim under part C, stating that claimants only
can receive medical benefits under part C if they previously have been
approved for cash benefits under part B. An administrative law judge
reviewed the Department of Labor's decision and agreed that Milam could
not receive cash benefits under part C. Milam appealed the administrative
law judge's decision to the Benefits Review Board, which affirmed the
decision. Milam then appealed the Benefits Review Board's decision to the
Fourth Circuit.
On appeal Milam argued that a claimant may receive cash benefits
under part C if, because of the excess earnings offset provision in part B,
the claimant cannot receive part B cash benefits. In addressing Milam's
argument, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the language of the Act and consulted
the regulations that the Department of Labor had promulgated under the
Act. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Act states that a claimant making
a claim "may file a claim for medical services and supplies under part C
of this subchapter." The Fourth Circuit additionally noted that the regulations promulgated under the Act provide that a part C claim which an
approved part B claimant has filed is a claim for medical benefits only.
Regulations under the Act also prohibit duplicative receipt of cash benefits
under parts B and C. The Fourth Circuit, relying on the general proposition
that courts should respect an agency's construction of a statute that the
agency administers, found that the Department of Labor's statement in the
regulations that a part C claim is a claim "only for medical benefits"
indicates that a claimant cannot receive cash benefits under part C after
that claimant has been approved for cash benefits under part B.
The Fourth Circuit next consulted the legislative history of the Black
Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (Reform Act) in addressing Milam's
claim that an approved part B claimant may receive cash benefits under
part C of the Act. According to the Fourth Circuit, Congress enacted the
Reform Act to provide part B claimants with an additional opportunity to
receive medical benefits under part C. The Fourth Circuit found that,
contrary to Milam's argument, Congress did not intend the Reform Act to
provide approved part B claimants with a second opportunity to receive
cash benefits under part C.
The Fourth Circuit thus rejected Milam's argument that a claimant can
receive cash benefits under part C of the Act if the part B excess earnings
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offset provision completely offset that claimant's part B cash benefits. The
Fourth Circuit's holding is consistent with two Benefits Review Board
decisions, Stowers v. Director of Workers' Compensation Programs, United
States Department of Labor, 9 B.L.R. 1-124 (1986), and Kosh v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of
Labor, 8 B.L.R. 1-168 (1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1986), in which
the Benefits Review Board decided that an approved part B claimant cannot
obtain cash benefits, but only can receive medical benefits, under part C
of the Act.
In Charlotte Memorial Hospital & Medical Center, Inc. v. Bowen, 860
F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth Circuit determined when a hospital
provider may receive Medicare reimbursement for costs that the hospital
incurred under the hospital's deferred compensation plan. To determine the
date upon which a hospital incurs reimbursable physicians' service costs,
the court considered whether to apply Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) or an alternative accounting method. The dispute in
Charlotte Memorial Hospital concerned a deferred compensation plan that
Charlotte Memorial Hospital and Medical Center, Inc. (Memorial Hospital)
offered to its practicing physicians from 1979 until 1981. Under the "Executive Compensation Plan" (the Plan), Memorial Hospital set aside a
percentage of physicians' salaries in a fund for the physicians' retirement
or to be paid as death benefits. Memorial Hospital deposited the deferred
salary funds in savings accounts and certificates of deposit.
As a prerequisite to participation in the Plan, physicians agreed to
render medical and consulting services that the Hospital reasonably requested
and to refrain from providing services to any other hospital without the
prior approval of Memorial Hospital. The Plan provided that physicians
who failed to honor these agreements could forfeit their rights to receive
payments from the retirement fund. Although several physicians had violated
the Plan's terms, no physician had forfeited the right to receive retirement
money.
After setting aside funds under the Plan during the 1979-81 cost years,
Memorial Hospital applied to the Medicare Intermediary, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of North Carolina (Blue Cross), for reimbursement of the costs
of administering the Plan pursuant to the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. sections
1395-1396d (1982) (the Act). Blue Cross rejected Memorial Hospital's claim
for reimbursement, finding that the Plan did not comply with the regulatory
interpretations that the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued
regarding reimbursement for the costs of a deferred compensation plan.
According to the regulatory interpretations that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (the Secretary) had made, Blue Cross could not reimburse
Memorial Hospital for salary costs incurred under the Plan until Memorial
Hospital actually made payments to the physicians. Applying the Secretary's
interpretations, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board affirmed Blue
Cross's decision to deny the Hospital's claim for reimbursement, and the
Hospital sought judicial review of the Secretary's regulatory interpretations.
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The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina reversed the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's decision.
The district court found the defendant Secretary's regulatory interpretations
inconsistent with 42 C.F.R. section 413.24 (1987) (the Medicare Regulation),
the controlling Medicare regulation. Section 413.24 mandates the use of
accrual accounting to determine proper reimbursement and indicates that a
hospital should receive reimbursement when the hospital incurs a cost,
rather than when the hospital pays a debt. The district court determined
that Memorial Hospital incurred a reimbursable expense when, in payment
for services rendered, the Hospital deposited a portion of the physicians'
salaiies in separate accounts on the physicians' behalf. Accordingly, the
court reversed the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's decision to deny
the Hospital's claim for reimbursement.
The Secretary appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Secretary contended that the
Hospital had not incurred a reimbursable Medicare expense by making
contributions under the Plan. The Secretary reasoned that, by placing salary
deductions in various accounts pursuant to the Plan, the Hospital merely
made an unsecured pledge to provide benefits in the future. Given the
forfeiture provisions of the Hospital's Plan, the Secretary maintained that,
if Blue Cross granted the Hospital's request for reimbursement, the Hospital
could receive reimbursements for salary payments that the Hospital never
would have to pay. Additionally, reasoning that amounts paid to physicians
equalled the cost of patient care, the Secretary maintained that the court
should depart from GAAP to insure that Medicare costs matched the cost
of patient care.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit first considered the Medicare
Act and the controlling regulation. The Act allows hospital providers to
obtain reimbursement for the lesser of the amount of the hospital's charges
to patients or the reasonable costs incurred in providing services to Medicare
beneficiaries. The Act charges the Secretary of Health and Human Services
with the authority to promulgate regulations interpreting "reasonable cost"
while considering national organization principles. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary issued the Medicare Regulation, which requires hospital
providers to submit to Blue Cross adequate documentation and bookkeeping
of the costs that the hospital providers incurred to obtain reimbursement
under the Act. In addition, the Medicare Regulation specifies that hospital
providers should use the accrual method of accounting to calculate the
amount of the reimbursement. The Medicare Regulation provides that,
under the accrual method of accounting, hospital providers record costs in
the period in which the costs are "incurred, regardless of when they are
paid." The Fourth Circuit observed that the Secretary, by contrasting "costs
incurred" with "costs paid," intended the creation of a debt and not the
payment of a debt to determine the date of reimbursement. Accordingly,
the court found that the regulation requires Medicare to apply GAAP. As
a result, the court believed that Blue Cross should reimburse the Hospital
when the Hospital had incurred a debt to a physician for services rendered.

